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IMPACT OF CDS ON THE US BOND MARKET 
 
Utomwen S. Iguodala 
September 2010 
Abstract 
 
The need to study the impact of credit default swaps on bond markets was borne from a 
desire to add to the debate which has been raging recently with regards to the role 
played by credit default swaps in the recent global financial and economic crisis. There 
have been widespread claims that CDS and the bond market are related and impact on 
each other. 
This paper analyses CDS and bond spread for a sample of US firms and finds support for 
those claims. I evaluate the impact that CDS and some firm specific variables have on 
bond spreads.  
Employing time series and panel models, I find that for 21 corporate and financial US 
firms, CDS and bond spreads are co integrated and CDS has a strong positive effect on 
bonds. The impact differs across both the corporate and financial issuers. I also find a 
small positive impact of earnings on spreads for a sample of 20 out of the 21 US firms. 
There is also strong evidence that during the second part of the global financial crisis, 
the firms experienced a large shock. This evidence was not present in the initial stage of 
the crisis. 
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1 Introduction 
Credit default swaps has been in the limelight in the last few years for all sorts of 
reasons. The market size for credit default swap has more than doubled each year from 
a total notional amount of $600 billion in 2007 to $62.2 trillion at the end of 2009. For 
credit default swaps, notional amount refers to the par amount of credit protection 
bought or sold, equivalent to debt or bond amounts, and is used to derive the premium 
payment calculations for each payment period, and the recovery amounts in the event of 
a default. 
Initially hailed as an innovative form of insurance against collateralized debt obligations 
(CDOs) and bonds, the recent global economic crisis has seen the product being blamed 
for the extent of the crisis. There is relatively extensive research on the links between 
credit default swap spreads and stock prices. This research project however, is looking at 
the relationship between credit default swaps and the bond markets. The aim is to 
contribute to the debate as to how these products have affected corporate bonds of US 
high investment grade firms.   
Consequently, in this chapter, the background and rationale for the study is discussed 
next, followed by the structure of the dissertation. 
1.1 Background and Rationale  
 
The credit markets have undergone considerable changes since the recent global 
economic and financial crisis of mid 2007.  The causes leading into the financial crisis of 
2007-2009 was notable for its systemic linkages, and the number of institutions and 
instruments involved Ire so numerous as to be all-encompassing. Because derivatives 
Ire at the centre of some of the major episodes of the financial crisis, including the near-
collapse and eventual bailout of AIG, no discussion of the crisis is complete without an 
analysis of the role derivatives played in the turmoil. 
Before the crisis, the credit markets enjoyed relatively low variation in risk and narrow 
credit spreads. Since the crisis in 2008, the reverse has been true and the reasons are 
attributable to essentially many factors. In particular, CDS notional amount had dropped 
by 38% by the end of 2008. At the end of June 2009, the U.S. corporate bond market 
had an outstanding notional of $6.8 trillion representing only a fraction of all debt 
securities outstanding across global corporate and government markets 
 Significantly, two out of many other factors which led to increased credit spreads, seem 
to have played roles in the current situation. The first of these factors is increased 
default risk, i.e. the risk of companies failing to honour their debt obligations, which 
occurs in an environment where companies encounter low profitability or even losses as 
a result of an economic downturn. The second factor has to do with a lack of liquidity in 
markets which naturally leads to investors requiring larger than normal compensation in 
the form of return rates. 
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The interesting aspect of studying CDS is that it insures against losses stemming from a 
credit event. Looking at countries, the contract protects against the default of the issuing 
sovereign. The premium (spread) which the protection buyer (e.g. a bank) pays to the 
protection seller (e.g. an insurance company) is determined by market forces and 
depends on the expected default risk of the respective country. CDS spreads are an 
indicator of the market's current perception of sovereign risk. CDS spreads also however 
depends on the global financial environment, in particular on US interest rates and global 
risk appetite. 
In the US, the CDS market has grown rapidly. Governments and their agencies in trying 
to manage the economy are therefore faced with the challenge of identifying which of 
the many factors are indeed contributing to wider credit spreads and increased volatility. 
To do this, governments normally gauge corporate bond spreads, i.e. the difference 
between the yield of a corporate bond for a given credit rating and the yield of a risk free 
asset, e.g. sovereign bonds of US or Germany (Abid & Naijar, 2005).  The difference is 
effectively the risk premium paid by corporate bond issuers to investors as compensation 
for taking on the risk, instead of investing on less risky assets. 
 
Recently, credit derivatives have provided a means of monitoring default risk.  These 
markets gained prominence around the mid 1990s and have grown exponentially since.  
It was during this time that a global financial crisis, although not at the scale of the 
recent global economic and financial crisis, necessitated changes in the financial markets 
that led to improved practices and greater transparency in the bond markets.  However, 
the recent crisis, suggests that more needs to be done. 
The most popular of these changes is the credit default swap (CDS). Siu, Erlwein and 
Mamon (2008, p.19) define how CDS works: 
 
„A CDS is a financial contract involving two parties, namely, the protection buyer and the 
protection seller.  The protection buyer pays the protection seller periodic premiums until 
the maturity of the contract or occurrence of a credit event, such as the default of a 
reference asset or entity. The protection seller pays the loss incurred by the protection 
buyer due to the credit event.  In other words, the protection buyers secures some form 
of protection (similar to an insurance contract) against the impact of a credit event 
involving the underlying reference asset or entity, such as a corporate bond or a loan, 
from the protection seller.  When a credit event occurs, the protection buyer also needs 
to pay a final accrual fee to the protection seller.  In return for all the paid premiums and 
accrual fee, the protection seller pays the protection buyer an amount equal to the CDS 
notional amount face value minus the recovery value at the time when the reference 
entity defaults‟ 
 
Default or credit risk has attracted considerable interest from various stakeholder groups 
like regulators, academics, and risk management professionals. This interest grew prior 
to the recent global crisis with financial institutions seriously incorporating risk 
management as a means of achieving and sustaining competitive advantage.   
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Basel II has also presented the opportunities for banks to determine their capital 
requirements based on internal risk management models, provided these banks have 
demonstrated effective risk management prior.   
 
The purpose of this research is to assess the impact of CDS on the bonds market, using 
21 companies in the US as case studies from January 2005 to August 2010 (see 
appendix A). Specifically, it aims to determine whether CDS has a positive or negative 
relationship with bonds and the extent of that relationship, i.e. whether it is a strong or 
Iak relationship.  Furthermore, it seeks to determine if the relationship is the same or 
otherwise during an economic crisis. 
 
The impact of CDS on the bond markets in general has been the subject of much 
research.  For example, some research focus on the extent of the relationship between 
CDS spreads, bond spreads, stock prices and credit ratings (Abid & Naijar, 2005). In the 
main, the majority of these studies focus on corporate bond spreads, with a few focusing 
on sovereign bond spreads.   
 
Other studies focus on „the local (macroeconomic) and global factors affecting the 
spreads.  Specifically, this group tries to explain the sovereign CDS and bond spreads 
with more frequent data such as daily equity indices, daily volatility measures, exchange 
rates, and interest rates (Aktug, Vasconcelles & Brae, 2008, p.3). 
 
Another set of research focuses on CDS pricing.  For example, Niskanen (2009) looks at 
the pricing dynamics between CDS spreads and bond spreads by examining the pricing 
of default risk in both markets. 
 
This research supports prior studies (like Longstaff et al, 2005; Hull et al, 2004; Norden 
and Weber, 2004) which found significant relationships between corporate bond spreads 
and credit risks.  This research uses CDS to represent credit/default risk. Furthermore, it 
supports other studies which have studied the factors which determined bond prices (like 
Cossin & Hricko, 2002; Hull et al 2004; Shim and Zhu 2010) which include CDS prices. 
As far as the Researcher is aware, previous related studies have focused on commenting 
on whether CDS caused the recent global financial and economic crisis. However, further 
contribution of this study, which is a slight variation to existing studies relating to the 
crisis, is that it looks to determine whether the relationship between CDS and corporate 
bonds in AIG varied before and after the crisis. 
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The findings and conclusions from this study would be useful to any stakeholder who is 
interested in learning a bit more than the basics of CDS and how they impact on credit 
markets.  For example, it may help to influence the decision making process of a 
potential investor. Policymakers are also interested in the impact of CDS market and 
corporate bond markets. My findings may be useful for market participants who rely on 
price data from different markets for trading, monitoring, or hedging against credit risk 
(see, e.g., Berndt et al. 2005, Norden and Weber 2005). 
 
Even though quite a number of studies have focused on the US market, their findings did 
not focus on the sample criteria used in this study. One reason is that I focus on 
companies in the US with no less than „A‟ rating on the S&P rating. Further description of 
the sample will be in the methods chapter of this research. 
 
I expect the CDS market and the bond market to be cointegrated. The reasons are 
because prior research proved that the CDS market leads the corporate bond market 
(see Longstaff et al. 2003). Second, the liquidity in the CDS market is much higher than 
that of the corporate bond market. 
The primary CDS-related issue during the crisis was that too much risk was concentrated 
in a firm in a market with minimal transparency, insufficiently collateralized positions at 
a time thus, liquidity simultaneously disappeared. One of the causes of this is the 
excessive reliance on leverage to enhance return. On that note, I will also look at firm 
leverage in my analysis of bonds and CDS. 
I are able to substantiate existing empirical evidence by means of a data set covering 
specifically, high rated firms, different data frequencies (monthly, weekly, and daily) 
over a different time series from that done by previous studies as Ill as across strictly US 
firms. In particular, different data frequencies and the sample composition allow us to 
investigate the relationship between the two markets. 
 
Analyzing time-series data from 21 individual firms over the period 2005-2010, I find 
that both CDS and bond spread move together for 21 U.S firms. I find on average that a 
strong positive evidence that CDS affects the bonds of the reference entities used in this 
study. Noticeably, this result is contrary to some similar studies based on US data that 
find a negative impact. 
 
I also find that the impact of the CDS varies across corporate and financial institutions. 
Corporate institutions impact on bonds spread tends to have a negative effect compared 
to financial institutions based on the sample. 
 
From my final analysis, I find that CDS trading is different during the crisis period. The 
global financial crisis that was examined in the sample period offered a case study for 
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the analysis of CDS and bond behaviour during distress. My analysis showed that the 
initial period of the crisis did not have a statistically significant impact on bonds but the 
second phase of the crisis had a strong positive and statistically significant impact on the 
bond spread. This suggests that CDS may have been good or bad for the crisis.  
A single entity; AIG was taken from the sample and analysed based on the objective of 
this study since I also know that differences can occur on a case by case analysis. 
 
 
1.2 Structure  
 
In the next chapter, a review of existing literature relating to credit default swaps and 
bond markets is carried out.  The review will include a brief introduction to CDS, followed 
by the two main credit models used to value CDS.  The review will also cover the 
relationship between CDS and bond markets before discussing the main risks that affect 
CDS and bond spreads. 
Chapter 3 describes the method employed to achieve the research objectives.  This 
chapter will begin with a formal presentation of the research aim and objectives, as Ill as 
relevant hypotheses formulated to achieve the research objectives.  The research design 
and processes followed will be included in this chapter, together with the rationale where 
relevant. 
Chapter 4 assesses the relationship between CDS and the corporate bond market in the 
US, using 21 companies in the US. To assess this relationship regression analysis will be 
performed to determine the extent of the relationship between the two variables as Ill as 
the impact another variable, firm leverage, has on bond markets in comparison with 
CDS.  The rationale for doing the latter analysis is to put the relationship between CDS 
and bond prices into greater context. The results from the regression for the 21 firms 
will also be discussed here. 
Chapter 5 carries out a similar assessment between the CDS market and the corporate 
bond market for the US. Similarly, the analysis will be in the form of a case study and 
will focus on the American International Group.  The emphasis is slightly different from 
the other reference entities used in this study.  In this chapter, the idea is to assess 
whether the relationship between the CDS market and the corporate bond market is 
stronger or weaker in an economic crisis period, compared to a period of relative 
economic health on the benchmark companies and a single entity. 
Chapter 6 is the Conclusion chapter which brings the research together and will describe 
the extent to which the aim, objectives and relevant hypotheses have been achieved. 
1.3 Summary  
The recent global economic and financial crisis has impacted financial markets in a way 
not seen for decades.  The issues of default and liquidity risks have been topical as they 
both seemed to have played a role in the global recession.  The role credit default swaps 
(CDS) have played in financial and credit markets are also the subject of intense debate.  
9 | U . S .  I g u o d a l a  
 
Critics believe they were responsible for the problems and should either be banned or at 
the very least regulated like never before.    
This project seeks to understand the relationship between the bond markets and credit 
default swap and the extent of that relationship at a micro level. 
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2 Literature Review  
2.1 Introduction 
Shim and Zhu 2010 in a theoretical analysis, suggests that  CDS trading can loIr the cost 
and improve the liquidity in the bond market by completing the credit market and 
revealing new information about firms,  and therefore creates both costs and benefit to 
the bond market. 
There have been several empirical researches that have tried to investigate the various 
ways through which the CDS market affects the bond of stock market. 
In this chapter, a review of literature relating to credit default swaps and the bond 
markets in particular are looked at.  Even though credit default swaps is a relatively new 
research area, there has been quality research with regards to areas like their pricing 
dynamics with corporate and sovereign bonds, as Ill as their relationship.  This chapter 
will help to set the scene for further work in subsequent chapters.  It starts by giving a 
brief introduction of CDS before describing the two main models developed for CDS.  
Literature on the relationship between CDS and bond markets then follow before writings 
on the key types of risks are reviewed. 
 This study also examines the time and market variation of the impact of CDS trading, 
particularly for the firms included from the UK and the US CDS indices. One would 
expect that such impact will be different at different stages of the credit cycle. The 
relative magnitude of benefits and cost associated with CDS trading or inclusion in CDS 
indices tends to exhibit distinctive features during the crisis period when compared with 
the times when the economy was stable. The data covers the global financial crisis that 
started in mid-2007. This offers a holistic look into the connection between the CDS and 
bond markets at various phases of the credit cycle. 
 
2.2 Introduction: Credit Derivatives and Credit Default Swaps  
Since CDS gained prominence in the mid-1990s, the market has grown considerably.  
„As of the end of 2007, the total notional amount of credit default swaps was estimated 
at $62.2 trillion, although recent efforts to eliminate offsetting trades have reduced the 
outstanding notional to $38.6 trillion (ISDA, 2008)‟ (Schwartz, 2007, p. 168, citing 
ISDA).  Credit default swaps (CDS) are widely regarded as one of, if not the most 
popular credit derivatives.  „The trading volumes of CDSs are so high that they often 
exceed the trading volumes of the corresponding reference entities, namely, the 
underlying corporate bonds or loans‟ (Siu, Erlwein & Mamon, 2008, p.20).   
CDS unifies as much as it divides.  Supporters of CDS point to its penchant for effectively 
spreading risk and contribution to market liquidity which empowers market participants 
to proactively manage their portfolios.  Some critics are so concerned by CDS that they 
believe „a spike in interest rates could trigger a derivatives tsunami that would bring all 
of the major banks to their knees and cause a blow-up in world credit markets‟ 
(Schwartz, 2007, p. 168).   
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CDS are traded over-the-counter (OTC) which makes regulation difficult.  „Since CDS are 
traded entirely over-the-counter, one could argue that the true regulators are market 
participants themselves.  Banded together as members of the International swaps and 
Derivatives Association (ISDA), derivatives markets participants have created system of 
documenting and amending trade relationships that is both flexible and robust‟ 
(Schwartz, 2007, p.170).  ISDA comprises predominantly of banks. 
2.3 Credit Risk Models  
During this period of CDS growth, different valuation models have been developed for 
credit default swaps.  These models fall under two categories, i.e. structural model and 
reduced form model.  The first of the structural models was developed by Merton (1974) 
whereby „debt and equity are priced by specifying a firm value process and invoking the 
contingent claims approach of Black and Scholes (1973) to solve for the value of the 
equity (which can be seen as a call option on the value of the underlying firm) and the 
value of the debt‟ (Schwartz, 2007, p. 167). 
Under Merton‟s structural model, the risk premium is a function of „the debt-to-value (or 
leverage) ratio and the volatility of the firm‟ (Schwartz, 2007, p. 168, citing Merton 
1974). Subsequent work has resulted in Merton‟s work being developed further (Leland 
and Toft, 1996 and Leland, 1994, for example).  These works have shown that default 
happens when an entities value process exceeds a determined threshold.  The structural 
model has come under fire, however, for being impractical. There have been 
reservations about its accuracy and the difficulty to observe inputs.  Consequently, the 
reduced form model was developed by economists like Hull & White (2000).  Under this 
model, default is an externally determined random process relying on „interest rate and 
bond market data to model a hazard rate, or conditionality probability of default. In 
these models the market value of a firm is assumed to be governed by a diffusion 
process, and the occurrence of a default is triggered by the event that the market value 
of the firm drops below a certain threshold level, called the default barrier‟ (Siu, Erlwein 
& Mamon, 2008, p.20).   
For the reduced form models, economists like Artzner and Delbaen (1995), Lando (1998) 
and Duffe and Singleton (1999) model default occurrences exogenously (Siu, ErlIin & 
Mamon, 2008).  „In particular, the occurrence of a default is modelled by a random point 
process, and the time of default is described by a stopping time, which is unpredictable 
with respect to the information generated by the market value of a firm‟ (Siu, Erlwein & 
Mamon, 2008, p.19).   
2.4 Relationship between CDS and Bond Markets  
 
In terms of the relationship between CDS and bond markets, Zhu (2006) used co-
integration test for 24 reference entities and found a stable long-run equilibrium.  In this 
state there is little or no arbitrage opportunities, which means that CDS and bond 
spreads „converge to each other, thus the basis converges to zero‟ (Aktug, Vasconcella & 
Bae, 2008, p.4).  Zhu (2006) finds that in the short run however, variations are likely 
because CDS are highly sensitive to changes in the credit environment and also finds 
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that CDS leads the bond markets in terms of price discovery.   Blanco, Brennan & Marsh 
(2005), in an identical study of 33 investment grade companies spanning 2nd January 
2001 to 20th June 2002, find that variations are caused in the short run by CDS spreads 
leading price discovery.  In the long run, the deviation is attributable to „the 
imperfections in the contract specifications and measurement errors causing markets to 
drift away from the equilibrium‟ (Aktug, Vasconcella & Bae, 2008, p.4) as Ill as 
compensation paid in the form of liquidity premium. 
 
Norden & Weber (2004) support the findings above in terms of CDS leading bonds in 
terms of price discovery.  However, according to them, this only happens for the US 
firms, whereas the reverse is true in Europe.  This insinuates that US markets are more 
efficient, when compared to their European counterparts.  Blanco, Brennan & Marsh 
(2005) and Zhu (2006) also come to the same conclusion.  Norden and Weber (2004) 
went further in an analysis of 58 entities spread across Europe, the US and Asia, finding 
that stock prices changes lead CDS, which in turns lead bonds.  In their study, co-
integration does not hold in all the entities, although it does in the majority of these 
entities. 
 
Indeed, Hull, Predescu & White (2004) find that CDS increases steeply for a big sample 
of corporate bonds.  Aktug, Vasconcella & Bae (2008) contributes to a previous study by 
Chan-Lau & Kim (2004) which carried out co-integration and causality tests and price 
discovery investigation for the CDS, stock and bond markets.  The study failed to find 
equilibrium relationships in some countries while finding in some others and finding that 
in some countries, the CDS market leads price discovery whereas in others price 
discovery is led by either the bond or CDS markets.  Aktug, Vasconcella & Bae (2008) 
studied „nine emerging markets and daily spreads from 2001 to 2005.  However, the 
price discovery tests are only performed for seven countries and  58% of the time CDS 
spreads are found to lead bond spreads, which is in contrast with the IMF study by Chan- 
Law and Kim‟. 
 
In terms of empirical work, Houweling and Vorst (2005) analyze pricing performance 
using the reduced form model based on CDS and corporate bond quotes.  Hull, Predescu 
and White (2004) focus on how rating announcements affect CDS.  Ericsson et al (2004, 
pp. 3-4) focus on credit risk.  They describe how they carry out their study:  „although 
my focus is also on credit risk, an important distinction is that I study very different data 
– default swap premia rather than corporate bond yield spreads.  Using default swaps 
rather than bonds has at least two important advantages.  First, default swap premia, 
while economically comparable to bond yield spreads, do not require the specification of 
a benchmark risk free yield curve – they are already spreads.  Thus I avoid any added 
noise arising from a mis-specified model of the risk free yield curve‟. 
Also Blanco et.al (2005) test the equivalence of CDS and bond spreads via cointegration 
technique. They show that, before the crisis, the derivatives (CDS) and the cash (bond) 
markets, price credit risk equally on average, concluding that the market for credit risk is 
efficient. I document similar results from my cointegration analysis of the spreads for the 
21 reference entities used in this study. 
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2.5 Default and Liquidity Risks in CDS and Corporate Bond Spreads 
One way to understand corporate bond spreads is to look at credit default risks.  
Investigators have tried to understand what proportion of corporate bond spread is as a 
result of default risk, and what proportion is as a result of liquidity risk. The rationale 
being corporate bond spreads are way too high to be attributable to default risk alone 
(Garcia & Yang, 2009).  Furthermore, (Elton et al, 2001) argue that corporate spreads 
do not reflect historical default rates and recoveries.  Huang and Huang (2003) also 
dispute that consistencies exist between corporate spreads and Merton (1974) structural 
models.  (Garcia & Yang, 2009, p.3. citing Collin-Dufresne, Goldstein, and Martin 2001) 
argue that „changes in spreads on corporate bonds are not Ill explained by changes in 
the factors affecting default risk and the unexplained portion appears to have a common 
factor. 
Ueno, Baba & Sakurai (2006), stress that due to the non-necessity of principals for CDS, 
the CDS market enjoys greater liquidity than the bond markets, even for bonds issued 
by the same reference entities.   
„The trading activities in the credit markets nowadays are comparable to those in the 
traditional markets:  bond, equity, and foreign exchange‟ (Siu, Erlwein & Mamon, 2008, 
p.20).  The importance of credit risks or default risks continues to play a major role in 
impacting upon the markets (Lie 2005).  Banks are the most important investors in 
credit default swaps as sellers, followed by insurance companies. 
CDS serves the same economic purpose as insurance and is an important hedging 
mechanism.  Bond investors seeking protection for the debts that are owed buy CDS to 
ensure that these debts are indeed repaid. Critics of CDS do not have a problem with 
this desire.  The problem was to do with speculators entering into the market.  As Money 
Morning‟s Gilani (2008) puts it:  „If you think XYZ Corp. is in trouble, and won‟t be able 
to pay back its bondholders, you can speculate by buying, and paying premiums for, 
credit default swaps on their bonds, which will pay you the full face amount of the bonds 
if they do actually default.  If, on the other hand, you think that XYZ Corp. is doing just 
fine, and its bonds are as good as gold, you can offer insurance to a fellow speculator, 
who holds the opinion opposite yours.  That means you‟d essentially be speculating that 
the bonds would not default.  You‟re hoping that you‟ll collect, and keep, all the 
premiums, and never have to pay off on the insurance.  It‟s pure speculation‟. 
That common factor could be liquidity risk, „since corporate bond markets are much less 
liquid than government bond markets‟ (Garcia & Yang, 2009, p.3).  Researchers have 
employed various methods to measure liquidity and default risk.  These will be looked at 
in turn. 
 
In terms of the relationship between corporate bond spreads and liquidity, researchers 
have generally found a positive relationship between the illiquidity of corporate bonds 
and their yield spreads (Garcia & Yang, 2009). These researchers include Chen, Lesmond 
and Ii (2007) who measured corporate bond liquidity using implicit bid-ask spreads and 
the frequency of zero returns.  Research carried out by De Jong and Driessen, 2006; 
Downing, Underwood and Xing, 2007; on how liquidity is factored into corporate bond 
returns revealed that speculative grade bonds paid greater liquidity risk premiums 
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attached, in comparison to investment grade bonds.  „Most of these papers estimate 
models focusing on one aspect of illiquidity, such as transactions costs, inventory risk, 
asymmetric information, or search costs‟ (Garcia & Yang, 2009, p.4).  Additionally, „most 
papers relate their illiquidity measures to corporate spreads in regressions, and are 
therefore not suitable to decompose corporate bonds into liquidity and default 
components (Garcia & Yang, 2009, p.4).   
 
(Garcia & Yang, 2009) finds that research into default risk reveals that default risk of 
corporate spreads are calculated either by using historical default rates and recoveries 
on the one hand, or by comparison with traded financial instruments like equity and 
credit derivatives. 
In the former method, default risk premium is not taken into account.  In other words, 
„no consideration is given to the extra premium that investors require to invest in risky 
securities whose returns are correlated with systematic factors.  In the second method, 
„according to Merton (1974), equity can be treated as a call option on firm values.  
Corporate bonds can be treated as a portfolio holding an equivalent risk-free government 
bond and shorting a put option.  Equity prices can be used to extract information about 
the firm‟s valuation process, which can then be used to price corporate bonds, (Garcia & 
Yang, 2009, p.5). 
 
Huang & Huang (2003) have shown that structural models are prone to misspecification 
which calls into questions the validity of using these models to decompose corporate 
spreads into their default risk and liquidity components. 
 
The use of CDS to obtain the default component is gaining popularity as it has been used 
by various researchers (Huang & Huang, 2003; Longstaff, Mithal and Neis, 2005).  The 
main reason for this is because they are difficult to be affected by liquidity risk, therefore 
they serve as a strong measure of credit risk. While CDS are admittedly very strong 
candidate for the measurement of default risk, and though it is hard for them to be 
affected by liquidity, they are not insusceptible to liquidity risks. 
 
 „Early studies of credit derivative markets Ire closely associated with the 
bond markets. They focused on pricing credit derivative instruments and on 
determinants of yield spreads of corporate bonds‟ (Niskanen, 2009, p.2).  
 
„The development of CDS pricing models has attracted more studies to 
focus on determining the components of corporate spreads as Ill as on predicting 
credit rating announcements by observing changes in CDS spreads‟ (Niskanen, 2009, 
p.2). 
 
Indeed, Longstaff et al (2005), Buhler and Trapp (2006) among the pioneers of 
investigating the significance of default risk component in bond spreads using CDS 
discovered that a significant portion of corporate spreads is attributable to default risk.   
 
Prior to Longstaff et al, other studies didn‟t find significant relationship between 
corporate bond spreads and credit risks (Elton 2001).  „In parallel with these studies Hull 
et al. (2004), Norden and Weber (2004) and Cesare (2006) studied how CDS prices and 
basis between CDS and credit spreads behave before credit rating announcements.  In 
particular negative rating announcements Ire found to be anticipated in the CDS prices 
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several days before the announcements (Niskanen, 2009, p.3).  This research study 
aims to lend support to the findings of studies undertaken by the likes of Longstaff et al; 
and Hull et al, indicating a significant relationship between corporate bonds and CDS. 
 
Norden and Weber (2009) in an empirical analysis of bonds, stocks and CDS, find that 
the CDS market of the US contributes more to price discovery than the bond market. 
This supported Longstaff et al. (2003) that used weekly lead-lag relationships between 
changes in CDS spreads and stock returns of US firms. They find that the credit 
derivatives market led the corporate bond market. Alexander et al. (2000) investigate 
the relationship between daily stock and high yield corporate bonds returns at the 
individual firm level during the period 1994-1997. They find that an opposite movement 
of the bond and stock returns around those events that indicates there is an agency 
conflicts between bondholders and stockholders.  
 
CDS spread and bond spread changes vary between highly rated firms and firms with 
poor rating. The high rated firms will exhibit less sensitivity than those with very low 
rating. (see Avramov et al. 2004, Blume et al. 1991, and Collin-Dufresne et al. 2001).  
 
Longstaff et. al. (2005) studied the default and non-default component of credit spreads 
using CDS information and find that both specific to the bond liquidity and overall market 
liquidity have an impact on the non-default component.  
 
In this paper, I contribute to the literature on credit risk pricing. I will make use of 
regressions to examine the relationship and the impact between credit default swap and 
bond spreads for given reference entities.   
First, I contribute to the literature on the empirical relationship between CDS and bond 
spreads. This study is in line with previous studies on the dynamic relation between CDS 
and bond spreads, such as Blanco et. al (2005) and Norden et. al (2004).  Compared to 
these, I look at a different time period, which goes from 2/9/2005 to 3/9/2009. I are 
mostly interested in understanding the impact of the 2007 financial crisis. 
Other studies have looked at the factors that impact on CDS spreads, while others have 
looked at the pricing dynamics between CDS and corporate bond markets.  For the 
former, Cossin & Hricko (2002) affirm that the factors that influence CDS spreads include 
maturity, credit ratings and volatility in line with theory.  Hull et al (2004) found a strong 
relationship between CDS and corporate spreads. This study will look at the extent of the 
relationship between CDS and corporate spreads to support the pricing dynamics 
findings of the likes of Hull et al.   
 
Other studies such as Zhu (2004) and Norden et.al (2004) reach similar conclusions 
when examining the relationship between CDS and bond spreads, Blanco et al (2005) 
detect cointegration for 27 out of the 33 firms in a sample of US firms; Zhu (2004) 
detects cointegration for 15 of the 24 firms; and Norden et al (2004) detect 
cointegration for 36 out of 58 firms. In general, for the US market there is cointegration 
in many cases.  
I contribute to the empirical literature on arbitrage, cointegration and market efficiency. 
If two series are cointegrated [Engle and Granger (1987)] they share the same 
stochastic trend and are expected to drift not so far apart. There will be recovery of 
deviations from their long run relationship. Cointegration is used in this study to check 
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the long run relationship between the spreads for the reference entities used in this 
study  
2.6 Summary 
 
Since its inception in the nineties, the credit default swap has been the subject of keen 
interest. Companies envisaged that they were extremely good profit maximization tools, 
and therefore there was a lot of takers.  The literature generally suggests a link between 
corporate bond markets and CDS especially in the long run with little or no arbitrage 
opportunities. 
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3 Methodology 
3.1 Introduction  
This chapter explains the methodology used to achieve the research objectives.  As 
aforementioned, the aim of the project is to assess the impact of credit default swaps 
(CDS) at a micro level.  Through the use of daily data, the analysis was based on a study 
of twenty one large companies.  This chapter outlines the research aim, objectives and 
hypotheses in detail and also shows the method of analysis used to achieve the 
objectives.   
The research aim and objectives is followed by a description of the research design 
employed. The third part of the Methodology chapter then details the research process 
before ending with the data source.   
Although the results are based on a small sample of firms from the US, they are 
consistent with recent research on the impact of CDS on bond spreads. 
3.2 Research Aims, Objectives  
The aim of this research is to assess the impact of credit default swaps on bond spreads 
of twenty one US companies.  Consequently, the following objectives must be achieved: 
1. Establish the relationship between credit default swaps and bonds for twenty one 
companies in the US.  
2. Investigate whether the relationship between credit default swaps and bond prices 
differed from the norm in the global financial crisis. 
3.3 Research Design 
Before the research was designed, the issue of paramount importance was to ensure the 
data obtained were credible and sufficient for meaningful analysis and conclusions. The 
Researcher considered several approaches before deciding on two which had strong 
claims to be ideal for this research project. The two approaches settled for were the time 
series and panel data analysis. 
The time series aspect of the research relates to Objective 1, whereby secondary data is 
used to establish the relationship between credit default swaps and bonds for twenty one 
companies in the US with high credit rating, and then adopt a panel data analysis to 
examine the time varying effect of the CDS trading on the bond market during the crisis.  
Here I explain in detail the empirical methods that have been used to address these two 
questions. I follow an approach used by Shim and Zhu (2010). 
In the time series aspect of this study, I study the long term relationship that exists 
between credit spreads and bonds through a cointegration test using the Dickey-Fuller 
test. This was done after I verified the unit- root and non-stationarity of the bond spread 
and CDS data. 
This is important as it sets the scene for the achievement of the other objectives. By 
gaining insight into the main determinants of bond spreads as covered by the literature, 
this informs the types of independent variables that would be used in the quantitative 
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analysis of objective 2. The second objective, similar to the first objective will involve 
time series analysis.   
The data covers 5 years, but offers most recent information.CDS data is provided by 
Markit and Thomson Reuters. This study will only look at CDS in relation to the bond 
market. I will analyze time series data from 21 individual firms over the period 2005-
2010, I find that the CDS market clearly lead the bond market spread and vice versa. 
The methods of data analysis to be used in this study is comparable to similar other 
studies like  Norden and Weber 2005, Shim and Zhu 2010, Fung et al 2008. The final 
data set consist of 21 firms with observations from the years 2005-2010(see Appendix 
A).  
The approach identifies a sample of firms that are listed on the S&P 500 that have 
similar characteristics. A large cross-section primary market data of bond issuances were 
looked at, with or without corresponding CDS trading written on the issuing firms. 
The cross – sectional sample of bonds includes those issued by firms with corresponding 
contracts traded in the CDS market. Those issued by firms without corresponding CDS 
trading, have been removed from the sample. The model specifications, which are 
estimation with OLS, are: 
BSi = β0 + β1CDSS1i + εi                                       (1) 
BSi = β0 + β1 CDSS1i+ β2 CRISIS12i + β3 CRISIS2 3i + X4i + Y5i + D6i + εi                 (2) 
BSit = β0 + β1 CDSSit+ Xit + Yit + εit                      (3) 
Where BS is the bond spread, defined as the difference between the yields of two bonds 
with different credit ratings. Most often, a corporate bond with a certain amount of risk is 
compared to a standard risk-free treasury bond. The bond spread will show the 
additional yield that could be earned from a bond which has a higher risk. 
The explanatory variables are similar in the two equations. The choice of the 
independent variables follow previous studies such as Elton et al (2001), Chen et al( 
2007), Ashcraft and Santos (2009), Shim and Zhu 2010. 
CDSS is a variable that shows the CDS contract traded in the derivatives market. If CDS 
trading moves together with the market by allowing for credit risk transfer, I expect the 
coefficient to be positive 
X is a set of firm-specific variables that include firm size and firm leverage ratio. Larger 
firms are typically associated with easier access to the bond market at lower cost. By 
contrast, high-leverage firms are viewed as riskier hence its coefficient is expected to be 
positive. 
Y is a set of the company‟s specific financial variables, which includes the firm‟s 
operating income stream, represented by the earnings before interest and tax, and the 
firm size. I expect the operating income to have a negative effect on the bond prices, 
because default risk tends to be lower during the high income period (high operating 
income). The effects of interest rates are likely to be uncertain.  
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To answer the second question, my sample period covers the global financial crisis, 
during which the bond market has been severely affected.   
 Hence I also introduce two dummy variables CRISIS1 and CRISIS2 that defines two 
phases of the crisis: one dummy variable defines the period in 2007 and September 
2008, the initial period of the subprime crisis; the other dummy variable defines the 
period during the financial issues of AIG September 2008, when the global crisis 
intensified and spilled (see Huang et al (2010). 
In the panel data analysis, I also run an analysis with a set of firm specific variables that 
define the entities used in this study. The panel data model will cover only 2008-2010. 
In addition, the sample firms are categorized as financial and corporate firms.  By using 
the corporate  firms as the control variables the effect of bond spreads based on the type 
of firm is assessed using a 0,1 dummy variable. This is to determine which set of bond 
issuers‟ (i.e. whether corporate or financial) has more effect on the bond spread. I run a 
number of panel regressions to see if the borrowers differ in their effect on the bonds. 
The rationale for using these measures is as follows: 
1) Firm size. Larger firms do not face much constraint in credit risk transfer and 
therefore their introduction to the derivatives market may not make significant 
difference to them. If that is the case, the coefficient is expected to be negative. 
2) Firm leverage. Firms with higher leverages are riskier. One may expect that 
riskier firms may benefit more from CDS trading by allowing for credit risk 
transfer. The coefficient here is expected to be a negative sign. 
3) Corporate firms typically behave quite differently from financial firms. The dummy 
variable „D‟ is for corporate firms. The coefficient here should be positive since 
CDS trading does not add much. 
3.4 Data 
The analysis of my sample bonds and CDS time series is conducted on a sample of 21 
U.S. firms that are listed on Table 1 with indication of sector and credit type. Data run 
from September 2, 2005 through September 3, 2010. The period is further partitioned 
into two considering that troubles for financial markets started approximately in the 
month of July 2007. 
Bond data. The first part of my data includes information on bonds issued by U.S firms. 
The time series of which is retrieved from Thomson Reuters. The issuers are both 
corporates and financial institutions, I exclude sovereign or government sponsored 
entities. The sample starts from the universe of bonds issued after 2004 by firms in the 
U.S. Even though there is data available before this period, I choose to begin from 2005 
because I will be more confident of the accuracy of the data used in this study.  
The challenge for this research was to get bonds which can be matched with CDSs for 
more reliable comparisons. In terms of bond data, corporate bonds issued by 21 
different institutions (Appendix A) will be used. Twenty one firms were chosen because 
this represents a good population of large firms with high quality data. AIG on the other 
hand was specifically chosen as its woes are apparently directly linked to CDS.  
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The bonds are senior bonds and must be denominated in US dollars. 
The issue for the sample size is that it was not possible to get all the bonds to match the 
CDS in terms of maturity.  In previous studies to get round this problem, the researcher 
used a portfolio of bonds with maturity time of less than four and a half years and more 
than five and a half years (Ho et al, 2010) which led to the portfolio maturity maturing 
the CDS‟s after interpolating them.  Due to insufficient data, this research adopted the 
approach followed by Niskanen (2009) and Ho et al (2010) whereby the red reference 
obligations Ire applied in this research.  As Niskanen (2009, p.13) writes; „as the time to 
maturity between CDSs and reference bonds differ, the use of reference entities may 
cause some inaccuracies, because the credit yield curve is time-wise monotonic.  
However, the credit curve is relatively flat after 5 years, which reduces the error and in 
addition the dynamics of the CDS and bond pricing should be only slightly affected by 
the difference in maturity‟. For uniformity purpose the high credit rated bonds for 
Standard & Poor‟s bonds was used in the analysis. I restrict my sample to firms that 
have a high credit rating of no less than A on the Fitch rating of firms in the U.S.  A 
particular reason why only high rated companies and bonds are used is to keep the 
structure relatively simple.  
To avoid measurement errors, bonds are straight issues with a fixed coupon and are not 
callable, puttable nor convertible, must be denominated in the same currency (USD) as 
the CDS contract, must not be subordinated or collaterised. 
Another type of bond data was required for the study, i.e. risk free bond yield. This data 
was required to calculate the corporate bond spread, which is the difference between the 
corporate bond‟s yield and the risk free bond‟s yield. For this research the bonds spread 
over swap rates Ire used. 
All the data are daily values and they have sufficient amount of observations for the 
sample size to be deemed credible.  
Table 1 summarizes the sample bonds. Almost 80% of the bonds are issued by corporate 
firms, with the rest issued by financial firms.  
In terms of the maturity structure, all the bonds have a maturity greater than 5 years. 
The bonds have low prices and high liquidity. This is not surprising as they are all high-
rated bonds. 
Firm’s balance sheet data. The second data source is the issuers‟ balance sheet 
information, which is from Infinancials. Data used here is from 2008-2010. I include firm 
specific variables in the analysis; firm size, operating income, and leverage, all 
denominated in USD. The firm size is the last market capitalization for each firm and the 
firm leverage is firm‟s financial leverage at book, short-term debt + long-term debt / 
total shareholders‟ equity. 
For the market capitalization, I use the last balance sheet information; current stock 
price/ total shares outstanding. I include all the reference entities in this panel analysis 
except Wachovia Corp due to insufficient data on the company. 
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CDS data 
The other part of the information of the companies is the CDS data. The time series is 
downloaded from Thomson Reuters. Thomson Reuters is one of the leading providers of 
the pricing information in the CDS market. They provide daily quotes of CDS spreads for 
a wide range of CDS contracts, across different dimensions including the, maturity, 
currency and restructuring clause.  
For this study, I examine CDS contracts written on U.S companies since 2005. I restrict 
ourselves to the most popular types of CDS contracts, i.e. 5-year maturity, denominated 
in US dollar, written on senior bonds and without restrictions on restructuring clause 
(see Packer and Zhu (2005). 
Figures 1 and 2 plots the monthly time series of the number of U.S firms included in the 
data. It is obvious that the CDS market in the US shrunk during the global financial 
crisis. 
For each of the sample bonds used in this study, I match them to the CDS data, this 
follows Shim and Zhu (2010) but I do not create a dummy variable to check whether the 
CDS and the bonds issued by the companies are quoted on the same day.  This is 
because during the sample selection, companies that did not have a matching bond were 
eliminated from the sample. All period before and after the CDS contract that did not 
have a matching bond contract, has also been ignored from this study. 
Since daily CDS spreads refer to constant maturity, I then compare the spreads with the 
bond spreads. 
Macro - financial data. The final part of the data is macro-financial variable of the 
issuing firm, which includes the firm size represented by the market capitalization, the 
earnings before interest and tax and the firm leverage.  
To further analyze the effect of the crisis on one of the firms from the sample. I 
formulated the hypothesis below to check this. 
Hypothesis:  there is a stronger relationship between CDS and its bond spreads 
for AIG during an economic crisis than in periods of relative economic stability 
To accept or reject this hypothesis, credit default swap and bond spread reports in the 
US covering a 4 year period will be analyzed. The rationale for using a four year period is 
so that the analysis could include the years before and after the generally accepted start 
of the global financial crisis. 
For the two sets of analysis a linear regression analysis will suffice with the relationship 
represented as follows:  
              
The rationale for this analysis is to be able to determine whether the CDS indeed 
exacerbated the crisis in AIG or whether it contributed to helping the ailing insurer 
recover. 
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For the analysis, CDS spreads and bond spreads data are obtained for the period July 
2007 to June 2010.  The analysis involves two sets of linear regression analysis for AIG, 
to represent the period during the global financial and economic crisis and the period 
after.  The data is split as follows:  the first linear regression analysis covers the period 
July 2007 to December 2008.  This period represents the period of the global economic 
recession.  This reflects the reality in that the crisis started late in 2007 and was deeply 
entrenched by December 2008.  The second period of the analysis, i.e. January 2009 to 
June 2010 is assumed to be the period after the economic crisis and is apt as it covers 
the period after AIG had been bailed out.  Although, crisis was still in existence within 
this period, the period was deemed appropriate to represent the period after the 
economic crisis as the US government had stepped in to aid the ailing insurer in the form 
of a bailout in September 2008, which was prior to this period.  
CDS spreads data was obtained from Markit, consisting of monthly observations for AIG 
for the period July 2007 to June 2010.  The monthly data was downloaded unto Excel.  
The bond data required to calculate monthly bond spreads was then obtained.  The bond 
yield data was obtained from Moody‟s and 5 year US Treasury bond yield data, obtained 
from Bloomberg was used to represent the risk free bond yield.  The difference was then 
computed to give the monthly bond spread data.   
The data was then split up to represent the two periods.  Panel 1 represented the period 
of the economic crisis and included monthly observations of CDS and bond spreads for 
the period July 2007 to December 2008.  Panel 2 represented the period outside an 
economic crisis and included monthly observations of CDS and bond spreads for the 
period January 2009 to June 2010.  The two sets of linear regressions were then run and 
the findings are presented and discussed in Chapter 5. 
3.5  Summary  
This chapter has outlined the methodology to be used to achieve the research objectives.  
In the main, it is quantitative research aimed at bringing objectivity to the research. It 
has described the research design and process and also explained the rationale for using 
the methods. 
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4 Data Analysis and Results  
4.1 Introduction 
This chapter provides results from the time series and panel data analysis aimed at 
measuring the relationship between bond spread and credit default swap spread for 21 
companies. To further measure the relationship between CDS spread and bond spread to 
assess the direct contribution of CDS spread, a panel analysis is also performed from 
2008-2010 for entities excluding Wachovia corporation.  OLS regression was also 
performed.  Finally, the effect on the type of organization on bond spread was also 
looked at through the use of a dummy variable.  
4.2 Relationship between CDS and Bond spreads  
 In the first part of the analysis, I believe that there is a long run relationship between 
the lnbondspread and the lncdsspread and therefore I estimate equation (1). As a first 
step, I verify the supposed unit-root non-stationarity of the CDS and bond spread series. 
I use the augmented Dickey-Fuller test. I run these tests for each of the 21 CDS and 
bond spread series. All 21 series are cointegrated. Results are shown in Table 2. 
As reported, I detect a significant cointegration relationship between spreads. This is 
consistent with Blanco et al. (2005) and Zhu (2006). 
This result suggests that the price and credit risk run equally in the long run. This is not 
very much a surprise as two prices that have the same risk will eventually remove the 
arbitrage opportunity between both markets. 
As illustrated in figure 3, the CDS and the bond spread, of a reference entity like for 
example AIG, tend to move together in time. All the other CDS and bond spreads exhibit 
a similar pattern. For studying long-term relationships among series that have a unit 
root, cointegration analysis is the appropriate framework. 
Overall, from equation (1), I find a strong positive and a statistically significant impact of 
CDS on bond spread for 21 reference entities in the US. The results show that 52 
percent of variations in bond spreads were explained by CDS.  The unexplained 
component could be linked to taxes, which could account for anything between 25 
percent and 75 percent of bond spreads (Elton, 2001). According to Krainer (2004) „one 
other obvious difference between corporate bond yields and government bond yields is 
their tax treatment; interest income paid on corporate bonds, but not government 
bonds, is taxable at the state level.  The top marginal state tax rates generally range 
from 5% - 10%‟.   
The results suggest that, for US entities, CDS trading has a sizeable benefit for the 
issuers in the bond market. For a 100 basis point increase in the CDS spread, there is an 
87 basis point increase in bond spread all things being equal. This could be as a result of 
price differentials in both markets. This price differential can be particularly due to 
volatility in credit conditions. 
This mirrors the finding of research such as Longstaff et al (2004) which finds that 
default risk (of which credit default swap spread is an ideal proxy) accounts for more 
than 50 percent of the variation in bonds. 
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My result is in contrast with that of Shim and Zhu 2010 which finds a negative impact 
based on data for Asian entities, and also in contrast with that of Ashcraft and Santos 
(2009), which finds no significant impact of CDS trading based on the US data. A 
possible explanation for the differences in results could be the difference in the 
development stage of markets between the Asian and US bond market in the case of 
Shim and Zhu, and in the case of Ashcraft and Santos, sample size, sample period, and 
choice of firms. 
In the second regression, from equation (2), I also examine whether the impact of CDS 
on the bond spread differs when firm leverage in included in the regression. Shim and 
Zhu (2010) find that the term between CDS trading and firm leverage has a negative 
impact on bond spread but this was statistically insignificant. In my time series 
regression analysis from Table 3, there is a positive impact and this is statistically 
significant. A 100 basis point increase in leverage will increase bond spread by 
approximately 1.8 basis points, all things being equal. An explanation for the positive 
relationship can be because majority of the firms in the sample under study are high-
leveraged firms. This however supports previous findings like Ashcraft and Santos 
(2009) that following the onset of CDS trading there is an increase in bond spreads of 
high-leverage firms. 
In the third regression, from equation (3), I examine further the magnitude of the 
impact of CDS on bonds if it can be different across corporate and financial issuers‟. The 
results are shown in Tables 1 and 4 in my time series and panel analysis. I find that all 
things being equal, on average the effect on bond spread for the corporate issuer is 
lower by 5 basis points compared to the financial issuer. This difference is statistically 
significant. So I reject the null hypothesis that corporate bond issuers and financial firm 
issuers do not differ in terms of the impact of CDS on bond spreads. This result can be 
because corporate bonds are more evenly distributed across the sample. Another 
possibility is the difference in the timing of issuance between the corporate and financial 
issuer. 
4.3 Impact of CDS during the crisis 
The introduction of the CDS market is an important step to complete the credit market 
by allowing for trading on credit risk, and it leads to the integration of various segments 
of the credit market. One side effect that such integration may bring on the credit 
market is that it may introduce a new source of market volatility. Any unsettling 
occurrences in the derivatives market may spill over to the cash market, and cause the 
whole credit market not to function properly, as may have occurred in the current global 
financial crisis, of which the CDS market has been the main focus. 
To find out if the impact of CDS trading varies over time, particularly during the crisis 
period, I re-run the time series regression by including a dummy variable crisis1 for the 
initial period of the economic crisis and crisis2, for the second period of the crisis after 
the issues of AIG. 
Table 3 shows the coefficients for the analysis of equation (2), as well as the confidence 
intervals (95%). Before discussing the results from the two OLS regression, it is 
important to note that, in both regressions, the two dummy variables that indicate the 
two phases of the financial crisis do not have the same effects on the bond spreads. The 
coefficients of the time dummies are very interesting. While in the first period of the 
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global financial crisis before the AIG issues (from July 2007 to September 2008), the US 
entities used in this study do not have a statistically significant effect on the bond 
spread. The period covering the September 2008 crisis after the issues of the AIG, 
shows that there is a positive relationship with the bond spread of the 21 US firms 
named in the sample. There is an increase in the bond spread by approximately 78 basis 
points. This effect is statistically significant. 
The non-significant result during the first phase of the crisis could mean that other 
factors were responsible.  
4.4 Panel Data Analysis 
The panel data analysis covers the period 2008 to 2010. Table 5 reports the results of 
panel regressions. The result is very similar to that of the time series as the overall CDS 
factors play a dominant role in affecting bonds. 
First, the coefficient of CDS is significantly different from zero. Exactly, the result says 
that for a 100 basis point increase in the CDS spread, there is an 89.6 basis point 
positive increase in bond spread. 
The coefficient in Table 5 shows an extremely strong positive relationship between the 
two variables.  Significant p value of zero enables the null hypothesis of a non-
relationship to be confidently rejected.   
However, in this instance, according to the R Square, 38 percent of the variation in bond 
spreads is explained by CDS spreads.  It is not a surprising result however, bearing in 
mind that due to the economic and financial crisis, governments around the world had 
been putting measures in place to reduce the effects and speed up economic recovery.  
One of the main methods used to do this is the lowering of interest rates. 
To examine the effect of the firm specific variables, I run the panel regression analysis 
again. With the exception of earnings, the firm specific effects do not have a statistically 
significant effect on basis spreads. Earning is a measure that investors can use to assess 
the financial health of a company. This differs across companies. 
The little or no relationship between firm size and bond spreads is unsurprising, since as 
mentioned in the Methodology chapter, larger firms do not face much constraint in credit 
risk transfer. 
4.5 Summary  
The regression analysis above has helped to prove that first, a strong relationship exists 
between CDS spread and bond spreads.  Second, the hypothesis that corporate firms‟ 
bond spreads are greater than financial firms was also proven through the use of a 
dummy variable. Third, the effect of CDS on bonds during the crisis has also be proven 
to be different at the two stages defined in this study. 
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5 Time Series Analysis of AIG 
5.1  Introduction  
To put the results of the benchmark entities into perspective and also to further provide 
the case as contained within the Special Commentary section as to there not being a 
one-size fits all approach, a time series regression analysis was also undertaken for the 
AIG company, pre- and post-AIG bailout period. 
In late September 2008, AIG had to be saved by the US Treasury and Federal Reserve.  
A multinational company with businesses in over 130 countries, AIG had ventured into 
the CDS business selling CDS for assets, some of which it has now transpired were very 
risky, e.g. residential mortgages.  As the global economic and financial crisis began to 
take a stranglehold, and the risk of default on bond commitments increased, AIG were 
forced to write down the value of its investments on CDS.  The crisis was to such a level 
that the insurer‟s credit rating had to be downgraded which is a serious course of events 
in terms of competition.  
AIG‟s problem worsened due to plummeting stock price which made lenders wary of 
lending to the company to release its liquidity burden. 
This chapter provides the findings and discussion pertaining to AIG.  The aim is to try 
and explain further objective 3 which is to see whether CDS impact on corporate bonds 
is different in a period of economic crisis.  A brief description of the issues that put AIG 
in the limelight in the midst of the global crisis is covered next before the results of the 
two linear regression analysis are presented and discussed.  A time series regression 
analysis is also conducted for the sample benchmark firm to help provide results that 
would either lead to acceptance or rejection of the null hypothesis that the relationship 
between CDS and bonds is not stronger during an economic crisis. 
5.2  The Bailout of AIG  
The shirt sponsors of Manchester United, AIG suffered the ignominy of being bailed out 
by the US government.  In return for an 80% stake in the fallen insurer, the US 
government handed over $85bn.  It was the action of one arm of the company that 
nearly led to its demise.  AIG Financial Products (AIGFP) based in London, England, saw 
the opportunity to maximize its profit opportunities by offering protection against what 
was considered at the time one of the greatest financial innovations of the 20th century, 
collateralized debt obligations (CDO).  The means to do this was through CDS, with the 
strategic thinking based on the premise that it is highly unlikely that there would be 
huge payouts as a result of default. 
Initially, AIGFP was on to something very good contributing more than $3bn to the AIG 
group in the form of revenues within five years from previous revenues of below $800m.  
Unfortunately, a significant chunk of the CDOs contained subprime loans, i.e. loans from 
risky borrowers.  AIG reckoned that even if some of these risky loans defaulted, the 
good borrowers would more than offset them, so it was a calculated risk that they were 
willing to take, from their perspective.  However, unexpectedly, the risky borrowers 
began to default on their loans at unexpected levels.  A lot of this was attributed to 
affordability.  The introductory rates were usually temporary and would go up 
significantly after say two or three years.  As risky homeowners started to lose their 
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homes through failure to meet their repayments, the effect on AIG‟s revenue was 
significant as they had to honour their commitments.  AIGFP ended up costing AIG 
around $25bn in losses which led to a collapse of AIG‟s share price.  AIG‟s predicament 
worsened when their credit rating was lowered by rating agencies, necessitating the 
insurer to provide collateral to its investors. 
The downward spiral continued to the point where the US government had to intervene, 
citing systemic risks.  In other words, in the eyes of the US government, if AIG was 
allowed to become insolvent, it would have a ripple effect on the US economy as a lot of 
institutional investors and other banks had invested in AIG.     
There have been vociferous criticisms of the deal with critics arguing that AIG were in 
effect being rewarded for failure with taxpayers‟ money.  Others believed the insurer was 
too big to fail.  
Initially, the CDS took the blame for AIG‟s near demise.  However, the argument is more 
balanced with more people citing human error and greed, as well as a lack of effective 
regulation of CDS as the reasons for the near collapse of the insurer.  
5.3 Results  
Another objective of this research is to investigate whether the relationship between CDS 
and bonds altered for the AIG firm during the recent global economic crisis. 
Consequently, the hypothesis tested was as follows: 
Hypothesis:  there is a stronger relationship between CDS and its bond spreads 
for AIG during an economic crisis than in periods of relative economic stability 
To prove this, two sets of linear regression analysis were performed for AIG.  The first 
linear regression analysis covered the period July 2007 to December 2008, while the 
second analysis covered between January 2009 and June 2010.  The rationale was clear.  
AIG had encountered so much problems that they were bailed out by the US government 
in September 2008.  Consequently, the first period is assumed to be the period of the 
economic crisis, as this was the time when AIG was most under threat.  Although they 
were bailed out in September the period was extended until December for two reasons.  
First, and more importantly, this was still a period when the economic crisis was at its 
peak. Second, it helps to balance out the data for the analysis.  Tables 6 and 7 provide 
the results. 
Table 6 indicates that 34% of variations in bond spreads in AIG were explained by CDS.  
With p value below 5%, the results are statistically significant.  However, the results are 
indicating that changes in AIG CDS spreads had little or no effect on bond spreads during 
the initial period of the crisis.   
Table 7 also shows little or no relationship even though 45% of variation in bond spreads 
seemed to be caused by CDS.  The relationship shows that the variation in bond prices 
can be explained more post crisis than during the crisis, contrary to the hypothesis and 
the previous results obtained from Table 3.  It is perhaps due more to things like interest 
rates as  we will see in the next section that has contributed more to the variations. 
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5.4 Special Commentary 
The chart below lends credibility to those who believe that CDS does not harm an 
economy.  It shows the opposite of what critics have been saying in relation to Greece, 
which is a country undergoing serious economic woes, currently.   
Looking at figure 4,  there was an increase in CDS and bond spreads at the same point 
in time when Greece were  experiencing falling fortunes – i.e. over the three month 
period from end of November.  According to (Reuters, 2010), „this chart shows that the 
fixed-income markets are working in exactly the way that they are meant to work, and 
that the CDS market is the Greece grease enabling them to do so. In an efficient bond 
market, the secondary-market yield on any given credit‟s bonds is very close to the rate 
at which that credit can issue in the primary market.  It can fluctuate up and down, but 
that changes the price of credit more than the availability of credit‟. 
The chart shows that despite Greece troubles, CDS ensured that investors did not sell off 
their bonds in a panic and that Greece was able to secure finance in the open market 
(Salmon, 2010). 
In the case of the former, instead of selling off Greece sovereign bonds to stave off 
potential heavy losses, investors take protection in the form of CDS.  CDS proponents 
point to the recklessness of Greece in attracting the situation they find themselves rather 
than due to CDS. As Salmon (2010) puts it „in turn, the ease of hedging marginal Greece 
exposure in the CDS market helped to ease the fears of investors active in the primary 
market, and Greece has continued to be able to issue debt without interruption.  So 
rather than demonize the CDS market and blame it for Greece‟s current woes, let‟s place 
the blame firmly where it belongs – with Greece itself, and its profligate ways.  And let‟s 
thank the CDS market for adding enough liquidity to the bond market that Greece‟s 
fiscal woes didn‟t become a major liquidity crisis. 
However, others were not so sure. As Boyd Erman points out: „Credit default swaps don‟t 
kill countries and companies; bad management kills countries and companies.  Yet credit 
default swaps – derivatives that allow traders to bet on the health of bond-issuing 
companies and countries – are once again in the news as the culprits in the potential 
downfall of Greece‟ (Credit Lime, 2010).  The piece goes a long way to defend the 
honour of CDSs, instead laying the blame squarely at the feet of bad management.  Of 
AIG, Credit Lime (2010, citing Erman) opined:  „CDSs also killed American International 
Group, if the headlines following its $85-billion bailout by the US government are to be 
believed.  More realistically, AIG tried to kill itself in a spectacular act of self immolation 
owning to brutally bad management.  The simple fact was the company wrote a bunch of 
insurance policies it couldn‟t cover, and CDSs were simply the form of insurance.  If AIG 
had mismanaged a life insurance portfolio and ended up requiring a bailout, nobody 
would be demanding the end of life insurance‟  
The argument here is simply that credit default swaps are as good or as bad as the 
policies and strategies which determine how they are used. 
Credit Lime (2010) gives five reasons in a nutshell as to why CDSs did not cause or 
exacerbate the global economic crisis.  
29 | U . S .  I g u o d a l a  
 
1.  „CDS simply reflect confidence (or uncertainty) levels in future outcomes. People 
don‟t believe in Greece‟s ability to put through enough budget cuts to balance its 
budget. Perhaps like “overly-successful” or just lucky American subprime 
mortgages, who are having a hard time downgrading from their unaffordable 
mansions to one or two-bedroom apartments, it‟s hard to go back to a more 
fiscally conservative lifestyle you feel you outgrew. 
2. In current sovereign debt crises, CDS represent a miniscule amount compared to 
the actual underlying government debts currently outstanding. In countries like 
the Hellenic Republic, it‟s about 3%. 
3. Bad management creates the inherent problems at companies or governments 
that CDS seems to do a better or earlier job at recognizing or quantifying. In 
Greek‟s case George Papandreou probably gets all the blame although the 
country‟s problem has been years in the making and there were previous prime 
ministers who‟s spending habits have at least partially contributed to what is 
happening now. 
4. Secrecy or uncertainty in both the CDS markets and in the accounting books of 
debt-issuers (corporations and governments) is what really drives panic in these 
crises. In Greek‟s case, not only is there a great deal of secrecy regarding who is 
actually trading or profiting in Greek CDS, but investors also don‟t believe in the 
government reported economic and financial statistics. 
5. Bond prices can actually fall further than CDS prices. In Greek‟s case, there is 
evidence that at times the CDS price has reacted in a positive direction earlier, or 
to a greater degree than the actual bond prices and yields have. It is the bond 
yields that matter as far as Greece‟s ability to issue new debt goes‟. 
In Europe, the backlash against CDS has been strong.  Although unproven, EU 
lawmakers recently passed a motion for tougher regulations aimed at curbing the 
perceived risks posed by CDSs.  The main areas that lawmakers wish to look at are a 
reduction of the amount of CDSs and also for the set up of a central clearing area (Tait & 
Oakley, 2010) 
However, according to Tait & Oakley (2010), „findings had not revealed the type of 
serious endemic problems with the Greek sovereign CDS market which would support 
the heavy-handed regulatory approach backed by several EU member states‟.   
Lawder (2010) reported that derivatives experts have indeed testified that the real 
reason for the Greece crisis was not because of credit default swaps, but because the 
Greek government overspent.  
So what is the impact of CDS on corporate bond markets?  Whatever the impact, it 
cannot be said based on findings, and contrary to some literature reviewed that they 
have exacerbated crisis in the corporate bond markets.  This is because the corporate 
bond markets have stayed pretty much intact throughout the global economic crisis, 
generally.  The problem in the bond markets lay in the sovereign bond sector especially 
in places like Greece and Portugal.  As the problem in the sovereign bond markets 
continue, investors, rather than cashing in are investing in CDS.  So it would be difficult 
to state with a great deal of certainty that CDS hinder the corporate bond markets.  
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„CDS are seen as an early warning signal for bond markets, alerting investors to 
structural weaknesses before a crisis hits‟ (Isaacs, 2010). 
5.5 Factors affecting bonds  
The first of these is interest rates, which has an inverse relationship.  In other words, all 
things being equal, when interest rates increase, bond prices tend to decrease and vice 
versa.  For example, consider a scenario where a corporate bond currently has a yield of 
5%, while interest rates are at 4%.  The corporate bond will be more desirable to an 
investor.  However, if the relevant monetary authorities were to increase interest rates 
to say 6%, then the corporate bond will cease being competitive.  Consequently, the 
price of the bond will need to reduce so that the yield can once again become more 
attractive to investors.   
As a result, an investor who is patient enough to wait until the UK‟s Monetary Policy 
Committee or its US counterpart decide to reduce interest rates, this will present a good 
opportunity to buy the bonds at low prices while enjoying high yield.   
Secondly, inflation plays a major role in influencing bond prices (Thau, 2000).  As 
inflation increases, bond prices normally fall.  This is because „unless the bonds are 
index-linked, the income they generate will fail to maintain its buying power.  To 
compensate for this dwindling buyer power, prices of the bonds typically fall.  
A third determinant of bond prices is exchange rates.  Where the local currency is faring 
unfavourably in the foreign exchange market, the relevant government may decide to 
increase interest rates, which will deter bond purchases. 
Last but not least, credit rating also plays a significant role in determining bond prices.  
The question remains in what way?  Investors want to be sure they are going to reap the 
benefits of their investment so they look to the credit ratings given by rating agencies 
like Moody‟s, and Standard and Poor‟s to help them decide.  Consequently, the lower the 
rating, the more likely it is that a company‟s corporate bond price will follow suit.  
5.6 Summary  
The analysis has shown that the hypothesis which argues that the relationship between 
CDS and bonds is stronger in an economic crisis has not been proven in the case of AIG.  
It has however been proven in the case of the benchmark companies which goes to 
show that the small AIG sample size of 18 observations on either side of the crisis may 
have contributed to the undesired results.  However, since the benchmark analysis 
involved hundreds of observations, one can argue with a great degree of confidence that 
the hypothesis holds true.  It also lends credence to the assertion that the relationship 
varies on a case by case basis.  
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6 Conclusion  
This aim of this research is to assess the impact of credit default swaps on bond spreads 
at a micro level.  Specifically, it looked at the relationship between CDS and bond 
spreads, using both panel and time series analysis over the period 2005-2010. I focus on 
the impact of CDS and its relationship to bonds through a time series and a panel data 
model analysis at different data frequencies and across a few U.S corporate and financial 
entities I also looked at the impact of the relationship between CDS and bonds in and 
out of an economic crisis from AIG‟s perspective and also using the 21 reference entities 
used in this study. I also looked at the impact of some other variables like earnings and 
leverage.  
The research was inspired by the rapid and transformational change that has gone on, 
and is still going on as a result of the recent global financial crisis.  The low volatility in 
the markets and narrow credit spreads in hindsight, seem to have been taken for 
granted.  Since the crisis, companies are paying greater attention to default and liquidity 
risks as a means of achieving and sustaining competitive advantage.  Credit derivatives 
are the most popular measures of default risk in the capital markets, especially credit 
default swaps, which can be likened to insurance; whether a buyer seeks protection from 
a seller for an asset he or she owns or do not own.  The initial focus on credit default 
swaps as the reason for the global economic crisis is being tempered now with 
proponents pointing to other factors.  Consequently, this research was undertaken to 
contribute to the debate in terms of whether CDS helped to mitigate or worsen the crisis.  
For such a relatively new topic, it is surprising as to the extent of research on the 
subject, with focus on pricing dynamics between bonds and CDS among other things.  It 
was also hoped that the research could help investors decide whether CDS are good or 
bad for the bond markets in times of economic stagnation. 
One of the key milestones in completing the project was to review existing literature 
relevant to credit default swaps and the bond markets in general. CDS definition, 
valuation models and the relationship between CDS and bond markets, and the key risks 
faced by them were covered.  It was from the review of literature that the aim was 
finalized as were the objectives and hypotheses.  The research then looked at the US by 
choosing twenty one multinationals to perform the analysis on. 
CDS coming to prominence in the mid-90s have grown exponentially.  The total notional 
amount stands at arguably over $62tn.  One of the key features of CDS is that they 
often exceed their corresponding reference entity which is a unique trait.  The divisive 
nature of CDS can be summarized thus:  proponents think they effectively manage risk 
and contribute immensely to market liquidity, while critics point to a lack of adequate 
regulation to prevent abuse, which they deem the main cause of the global economic 
crisis.  Furthermore, the critics fear a significant increase in interest rates could lead to 
disaster as far as derivatives are concerned. 
The literature revealed a long run equilibrium relationship between CDS and bond 
markets with hardly any arbitrage opportunities.  However, in the short run there was 
some evidence of variation due to the high probability of the sensitivity of CDS to 
changes in the credit environment among other things.   
There seemed very little opposition in the literature that CDS leads  the bond markets in 
terms of price discovery, with the exception of Norden & Weber (2004), whom while 
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conceding that that was the case in the US, in Europe, they found the opposite to be 
true; and Blanco, Brennan & Marsch (2005); and Zhu (2006) who share the same 
opinion. 
The review of literature also found that corporate bond spreads include a combination of 
default and liquidity risk.  Researchers like Chen, Lesmond and Wei (2007) have found 
that the more illiquid a corporate bond is the greater their yield spreads.   
While a lot of research found a significant relationship between corporate bond spreads 
and credit risks, a few didn‟t (Elton, 2001), while the determinants of CDS spreads were 
identified to include maturity, credit ratings, and volatility.   
Since CDS are traded over the counter, regulation is difficult.  Critics fear that the 
absence of effective regulation turns the market into a speculative free for all. 
On the subject of liquidity again, speculative grade bonds paid more in terms of liquidity 
risk premium compared to investment grade bonds. 
First, analyzing the aggregate cointegration, I find that CDS and bond spreads in line 
with previous studies are cointegrated. I also find in the time series analysis that the 
CDS has a strong positive impact on bond spreads for 21 U.S reference entities. 
In this study, the strong relationship between CDS spread and bond spread, was proven.  
The p value was able to prove the significance of the results.  The striking thing about 
the results was that contrary to literature, with the exception of earnings before interest 
and tax, and leverage; other variables like firm size did not seem to have significant 
impact on bond spreads. The findings here are in line with relevant chunk of data, and 
research that was reviewed as part of the literature review section. Furthermore, it is 
quite likely that the unexplained parts were heavily influenced by interest rates. 
It  was proven in that there was lesser spread for the corporate firms than for financial 
firms as expected. 
Second, I find in my time series analysis using dummy variables, the impact of CDS on 
bond spread during the crisis. The strong relationship between  CDS and its bond 
spreads during an economic crisis than in periods of relative economic stability was  
emphatically proven, only with the exception of the initial phase of the crisis, where we 
did not find a statistically significant result.   
While indeed CDS does lead price discovery, this research‟s contribution to the debate is 
that based on the varying results from the analysis, it is clear that one size does not fit 
all.  In other words, while CDS will have the potential to impact negatively on the bond 
markets, it equally has a chance to impact positively as well.  The argument that the 
way investors sought to exploit the opportunities provided by CDS and other credit 
derivatives, rather than the products themselves, was the problem seems to hold true.  
In other words, it would do no harm if some regulation were put in place to minimize the 
kind of greedy speculation that may cause an economic panic at the slightest sign of 
trouble.   
The corporate bond markets has emerged relatively unscathed from the global crisis as 
is to be expected when share prices are falling. However, although out of the scope of 
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this research, sovereign bonds have been hit more severely. In terms of the impact of 
CDS on the bond market, it is safe to argue that they have the potential to both mitigate 
the risk and make the situation worse.  As Shanahan (2010) reports:   
„The cost of insuring against losses on European corporate bonds fell to the lowest levels 
since May after a report showed the UK economy grew almost twice as much as 
economists forecast in the second quarter.  The Markit iTraxx Crossover Index of credit-
default swaps on 50 companies with mostly high-yield credit ratings decreased 13 basis 
points to 500, according to JP Morgan Chase & co. prices at 9.30 a.m. in London, the 
lowest level since May 13.  The index is a benchmark for the cost of protecting bonds 
against default and a decline signals improvement in perceptions of credit quality.  The 
Markit iTraxx Europe Index of 125 companies with investment-grade ratings fell 3.25 
basis points to 111, the lowest since May 14, JP Morgan prices show.  The cost of 
protecting bank bonds from default also declined, with the Markit iTraxx Financial Index 
of 25 banks and insurers down 4 basis points at 130, the lowest since May 12‟. While 
this indicates a reduction in corporate bond risks, it also captures perfectly a key point 
about CDS.  While it can contribute to adverse occurrences in the bond markets, 
especially when speculators become greedy, it also serves as a good indicator as to the 
health of an economy. 
Even in the US the signs of recovery are clear and the increased importance of the 
corporate bond market is noted by Wright & Paulden (2010): 
„A benchmark indicator of corporate credit risk in the US fell for the third time this week 
as companies including United Parcel Service Inc and AT&T Inc. boosted profit forecasts.  
Credit Default swaps on the Markit CDX North America Investment Grade Index, which 
investors use to hedge against losses on corporate debt or to speculate on 
creditworthiness declined 2.8 basis points to a mid-price of 108.7 basis points as of 
11.44am in New York, according to index administrator Markit Group Ltd. The index 
typically fall as investor confidence improves‟.  Wright & Paulden (2010, quoting Gary 
Jenkins, of Evolution Securities Ltd, London) explain that „the market is focusing more 
and more on the earnings than the economic data.  While the economic data has been 
slightly soft, the earnings thus far have been positive.  There are a lot of investors who 
think that taking company risk at this stage, whether it‟s in equities or credit, whether 
it‟s derivatives or bonds, is actually a good thing to do.  It‟s a relatively safe place to be.  
In a world of uncertainty, corporate debt does appear to offer some kind of value‟.   
The research would have been richer with primary data, especially one obtained through 
an interview with an industry professional. 
The challenge for this research was to get bonds which can be matched with CDSs for 
more reliable comparisons. 
The issue for the sample size is that it was not possible to get all the bonds to match the 
CDS in terms of maturity. 
Obtaining data was a significant problem, for this type of research and compromises had 
to be made due to cost considerations. 
Since credit default swap are currently traded over the counter, there are not enough 
avenues to gain access to accurate data. 
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Despite some limitations due to data imperfections and methodological issues, I think 
these analysis capture the impact of CDS on the entities used for this study and also the 
impact during the global economic crisis. 
In terms of further research, it is recommended that the extent of the impact of interest 
rates on bond spreads be examined as this research through a review of literature found 
evidence of a relationship. A broader sample size can also be analysed and compared 
across other continents to test further the impact of the global crisis. 
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APPPENDIX 
 
Appendix A 
Refrence Entity Sector credit type ISIN 
Allergan Inc. Pharmaceuticals Corporate US01849QAN51 
American Express Bank Consumer Finance Financial US0258161092 
American International Bank Full Line Insurance Financial US026874AS63 
Amgen Inc Biotechnology Corporate US031162AH34 
AT&T corporation Fixed Line 
Telecommunications 
Corporate US00206RAB87 
Black & Decker Corporation Durable Household Products Corporate US854616AK51 
Boeing Capital Corp. Aerospace Corporate US097023AU94 
Bristol-Myers Squibb Corp Pharmaceuticals Corporate US110122AL21 
Dover corp Industrial Machinery Corporate US260003AF59 
Goldman Sachs Gp Inc Investment Services Financial US38141G1040 
Halliburton Co Oil Equipment & Services Corporate US406216AR24 
Hewlette Packard Co Computer Hardware Corporate US428236AG84 
Honey Well Intl. Inc. Diversified Industrials Corporate US438516AN69 
Johnson & Johnson Pharmaceuticals Corporate US478160AL82 
Noble Energy Exploration & Production Corporate USG65422AA86 
Occidental Petroleum Exploration & Production Corporate US674599BV68 
Oracle Corp. Software Corporate US68402LAC81 
Pitney-Bowes Inc. Electronic Office Equipment Corporate US72447WAU36 
Wachovia Corp Banks Financial US929903AE28 
Wells Fargo & Co Consumer Finance Financial US949746FJ50 
Western Union Co Banks Financial US959802AA70 
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Table 1 Summary statistics of time series variables 
variables obs mean std. dev. min max 
year 27426 2007.674 1.490 2005 2010 
firms 27426 11.000 6.055 1 21 
bonds 27426 115.149 212.049 -60.100 3197.800 
cds 27426 77.758 166.750 0.000 3683.120 
crisis1 27426 0.429 0.203 0 1 
crisis2 27426 0.149 0.356 0 1 
issuer 27426 0.810 0.393 0 1 
time  27426 13713.500 7917.349 1 27426 
 
Table 2  Dickey-Fuller test 
Method statistic prob 95% conf. interval cross section obs 
Null:Unit 
root 
      
ADF -25.340 0.000 -0.048 -0.041 21 24716 
The tests statistic of -25.340 is more than the critical values at 5% in the critical values of the 
ADF tables. Hence, we reject the null and confirm that the variables are stationary. 
 
Table 3  Time series analysis 
Variables bond 
spread 
p> /t/ 95% 
conf. 
interval R-
squared 
Adj R-
squared 
cds spread 0.870 0.000 0.860 0.881 0.522 0.522 
Firm effect       
leverage 0.018 0.000 0.013 0.024 0.557 0.557 
Issuer type       
Issuer -0.050 0.000 -0.077 -0.023 0.523 0.522 
Global financial 
crisis 
      
crisis1* 0.010 0.691 -0.039 0.059 0.522 0.522 
crisis2 0.783 0.000 0.753 0.812 0.569 0.569 
* there maybe other factors responsible for this 
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Table 4 Summary statistics of panel data variables 
variables obs mean std. dev. min max 
year 60 2009.000 0.823 2008 2010 
firms 60 10.600 5.978 1 20 
bonds 60 152.284 113.413 -10.126 611.021 
CDS 60 100.610 88.943 21.474 530.044 
EBIT 60 16.779 16.217 -3.540 81.760 
Market capitalization 60 56413.670 50877.410 1.250 163476.300 
Leverage 60 -33.454 6601.242 -38808.650 32494.040 
issuer 60 0.792 0.408 0.000 1.000 
 
 
Table 5 Panel data analysis 
Column1 bond 
spread 
p> /t/ 95% 
conf. 
interval R-squared Adj R-
squared 
CDS spread 0.896 0.000 0.586 1.205 0.375 0.364 
Firm specific effects 
EBIT -2.987 0.002 -4.832 -1.142 0.174 0.130 
market 
capitalization 
0.0180 0.728 -0.085 0.121 0.376 0.354 
Issuer type 
issuer -0.654 0.006 -1.112 -0.196 0.456 0.436 
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Table 6  Linear regression analysis for AIG pre crisis 
AIG Pre-bailout 
      
       Regression Statistics 
     Multiple R 0.582248721 
     R Square 0.339013573 
     Adjusted R Square 0.297701921 
     Standard Error 0.677661354 
     Observations 18 
     
       ANOVA 
        df SS MS F Significance F 
 Regression 1 3.768512547 3.768512547 8.206246 0.011234891 
 Residual 16 7.347598564 0.45922491 
   Total 17 11.11611111       
 
         Coefficients Standard Error t Stat P-value Lower 95% Upper 95% 
Intercept 2.09 0.19 10.93 0.00 1.68 2.49 
CDS AIG 0.00 0.00 2.86 0.01 0.00 0.00 
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Table 7 Linear regression analysis for AIG post crisis 
 
AIG Post-Bailout  
        
         Regression Statistics 
       Multiple R 0.70 
       R Square 0.48 
       Adjusted R Square 0.45 
       Standard Error 0.23 
       Observations 18 
       
         ANOVA 
        
  df SS MS F 
Significance 
F 
   Regression 1 0.82 0.82 14.95 0.00 
   Residual 16 0.87 0.05 
     Total 17 1.69     
   
         
  Coefficients 
Standard 
Error t Stat P-value Lower 95% 
Upper 
95% 
Lower 
95.0% 
Upper 
95.0% 
Intercept 2.76 0.09 31.17 0.00 2.57 2.94 2.57 2.94 
CDS AIG 0.00 0.00 3.87 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
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Figure 1 Time series of CDS spread for 21 US reference entities 
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Figure 2 Time series of bond spread for 21 US reference entities 
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  Figure 3  Time series of AIG’s CDS and bond spread.The bond spread is calculated over 
the 5 year swap rate. Sample period is 2/9/2005- 3/9/2010. 
 
Figure 4 Greece sovereign CDS and bond spreads (source: Reuters) 
 
